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We study the diversification effects from introducing hedge funds into a traditional 
portfolio of stocks and bonds. Our results make it clear that in terms of skewness and 
kurtosis equity and hedge funds do not combine very well. Although the inclusion of hedge 
funds may significantly improve a portfolio’s mean-variance characteristics, it can also be 
expected to lead to significantly lower skewness as well as higher kurtosis. This means that 
the case for hedge funds includes a definite trade-off between profit and loss potential. Our 
results also emphasize that to have at least some impact on the overall portfolio, investors 
will have to make an allocation to hedge funds which by far exceeds the typical 1-5% that 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds are often said to provide investors with the best of both worlds: an 
expected return similar to equity with a risk similar to that of bonds. When risk is 
defined, as is traditionally the case, as the standard deviation of the fund return, this is 
indeed true. Recently, however, several studies have shown that the risk characteristics 
of hedge funds are substantially more complex than those of stocks and bonds. This 
means that when hedge funds are involved it is no longer appropriate to use the standard 
deviation as the sole measure of risk. Investors will have to give weight to the return 
distribution’s higher moments, in the form of its (co-)skewness and (co-)kurtosis, as 
well. When doing so, it becomes evident that hedge funds are not necessarily a free 
lunch: hedge funds’ attractive mean-variance characteristics may be accompanied by 
significantly less attractive skewness and kurtosis properties.     
 
Amin and Kat (2002) investigated the performance of randomly selected baskets of 
hedge funds ranging in size from 1 to 20 funds. Their analysis showed that increasing 
the number of funds can be expected to lead not only to a lower standard deviation but 
also, and less attractive, to lower skewness and increased correlation with the stock 
market. Mean, kurtosis and correlation with bonds tended to be largely unaffected by 
the number of funds. In the same paper it was also shown that individual hedge funds 
show extremely high variation in performance. When combined into portfolios the 
degree of variation drops strongly, although at a decreasing rate. For portfolios 
containing more than 15 funds the further decline in variation is only small.  
 
Most investors tend to hold hedge funds as part of a balanced portfolio containing 
stocks, bonds and possibly real estate and private equity as well. In this paper we 
therefore extend the analysis of Amin and Kat (2002) to investigate the diversification 
effects that occur when combining hedge funds with stocks and bonds. We not only 
look at the means and standard deviations of the resulting portfolios’ return 
distributions, but also at their skewness and kurtosis. Our results make it clear that 
hedge funds do not mix too well with equity. Although including hedge funds in a 
traditional investment portfolio may significantly improve that portfolio’s mean-ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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variance characteristics, it can also be expected to lead to significantly lower skewness 
as well as higher kurtosis. This means that the case for hedge funds is less 
straightforward than often suggested and requires investors to make a trade-off between 
profit and loss potential. Our results also emphasize that as long as investors do not 
invest a substantial portion of their wealth in hedge funds, hedge funds will have little or 
no impact on the overall portfolio characteristics. This is an important observation given 
that most institutional investors that are currently considering to invest in hedge funds 
do not appear to be planning to allocate more than 1–5% to hedge funds.
1  
 
II. THE DATA 
The hedge fund data used in this study were obtained from Tremont TASS, which is 
one of the largest hedge fund databases currently available. After eliminating funds 
with incomplete and ambiguous data as well as funds of funds, per May 2001 the 
database at our disposal contains monthly net of fee returns on 1195 live and 526 
dead funds. As shown in Amin and Kat (2001b), concentrating on live funds only 
will on average overestimate the mean return on individual funds by around 2% as 
well as introduce a significant downward bias in estimates of the standard deviation, 
an upward bias in the skewness and a downward bias in the kurtosis estimates of 
individual fund returns. To correct for this in our analysis we decided not to work 
with the raw return series of the 264 funds that survived the period 1994-2001. 
Instead we created 455 7-year monthly return series by, starting off with the 455 
funds that were alive in June 1994, replacing every fund that closed down during the 
sample period by a fund randomly selected from the set of funds alive at the time of 
closure, following the same type of strategy and of similar age and size. For 
simplicity, we will still refer to the data series thus obtained as ‘fund returns’.  
 
Implicitly we assume that in case of a fund closure investors are able to roll from one 
fund into the other at the reported end-of-month net asset values and at zero additional 
costs. This will underestimate the true costs of fund closure to the investor for two 
reasons. First, when a fund closes shop its investors will have to look for a 
replacement. This search takes time and is not without costs. Second, investors may 
get out of the old and into the new fund at values that are less favourable than the end-ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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of-month net asset values contained in the database. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
incorporate this into the analysis in a satisfactory way without further detailed 
information.    
 
To represent stocks we use the S&P 500 index, while bonds are represented by the (10-
year) Salomon Brothers Government Bond index. Over the sample period monthly S&P 
returns have a mean of 1.46%, a standard deviation of 4.39%, a skewness of –0.80 and a 
kurtosis of 3.92. Monthly bond index returns have a mean of 0.43%, a standard 
deviation of 1.77%, a skewness of 0.56 and a kurtosis of 4.29.   
 
III. DIVERSIFICATION WITH HEDGE FUNDS 
One reason why investors allocate to hedge funds is to reduce risk without loss of 
expected return. Based on monthly return data over the period 1994-2001, a portfolio of 
50% stocks and 50% bonds has an expected return of almost 1% per month. The same 
is true for a diversified hedge fund portfolio. With hedge funds only loosely correlated 
with stocks and bonds, this means that by replacing stocks and bonds with hedge funds 
investors can reduce the standard deviation of the portfolio return while maintaining the 
expected return at around 1%. To study this diversification process in more detail, we 
created 500 different portfolios containing 20 hedge funds each by random sampling 
without replacement from the above 455 funds. Subsequently, we combined every one 
of these hedge fund portfolios with stocks and bonds in proportions ranging from 0% to 
100% invested in hedge funds. Doing so, it was assumed that the proportions of wealth 
invested in stocks and bonds are always equal. This gives rise to portfolios like 40% 
stocks, 40% bonds and 20% hedge funds, 30% stocks, 30% bonds and 40% hedge 
funds, etc. From the monthly returns on the resulting portfolios we calculated four 
different sample statistics: the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. For 
hedge fund allocations ranging from 0% to 100%, the 5
th, 10
th, etc. percentiles of the 
frequency distributions of these four statistics are shown in figure 1-4. 
 
Many will argue that investors (including fund of funds managers) do not select 
portfolios by random sampling. This is certainly true. However, although many ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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investors spend a lot of time and effort selecting hedge funds, this does not necessarily 
mean that in many cases a randomly sampled portfolio is not a good proxy for the 
portfolio ultimately selected. So far, there is no evidence that some investors are 
consistently able to select future out-performers
2 nor of the existence of specific patterns 
or anomalies. When corrected for possible biases, there is no significant persistence in 
hedge fund performance nor is there any significant difference in performance between 
older and younger funds, large and small funds, etc. In addition, older funds may be 
(more or less) closed for new investments. Investors that are relatively new to hedge 
fund investing are therefore often forced to invest in funds with little or no track record. 
If so, selecting funds based on (the statistical properties of) their track record is not an 
option. The fund prospectus and interviews with managers may provide some 
information, but in most cases this information will only be sketchy at best and may add 
more confusion than actual value.        
 
<< Insert Figure 1-2 >> 
 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distributions of the mean portfolio return for varying 
hedge fund allocations. A portfolio of 50% stocks and 50% bonds has a mean return 
of 0.95%. Since the mean return of a portfolio is simply the weighted average of the 
means of its components, the introduction of hedge funds makes the median mean 
return change linearly from 0.95% when no hedge funds are included to 0.99% (the 
mean return on the median basket of 20 hedge funds) when 100% is invested in hedge 
funds. Figure 2 shows the frequency distributions of the standard deviation of the 
portfolio return. Here a more interesting picture emerges. Starting at 2.49% for the 
case of no hedge funds, the median standard deviation drops first but rises later to end 
at a standard deviation of 2.44% when 100% is invested in hedge funds. The drop 
represents the relatively low correlation of hedge funds with stocks and bonds. The 
median standard deviation reaches its minimum at a hedge fund allocation of 50%, 
which makes it very clear that to obtain at least some diversification benefits investors 
will have to allocate a very substantial part of their wealth to hedge funds.  
   
    << Insert Figure 3-4 >> ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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The frequency distributions of the skewness of the portfolio return are shown in 
figure 3. The graph shows a remarkable similarity with that of the standard deviation. 
Starting at –0.32, the median skewness drops first and rises later to end at –0.52 when 
100% is invested in hedge funds. The median reaches a minimum of –0.86 at a hedge 
fund allocation of 55%. Finally, figure 4 shows the frequency distributions of the 
kurtosis of the portfolio return.  Starting at 2.90, the median kurtosis rises gradually 
towards the kurtosis level of the median portfolio of hedge funds (5.39). The graph is 
somewhat S-shaped though, meaning that most of the rise takes place for hedge fund 
allocations between 25% and 65%. For allocations smaller than 25% the effect from the 
inclusion of hedge funds on the kurtosis of the overall portfolio return is relatively 
limited.  
 
Overall, it appears that the case for using hedge funds for diversification purposes is not 
as straightforward as is often suggested. Hedge funds can indeed be expected to reduce 
a portfolio’s standard deviation, but only at the cost of lower skewness and increased 
kurtosis. In addition, and not completely unexpected, figure 1-4 show that to realize at 
least some of the diversification effect investors will have to invest a large proportion of 
their assets in hedge funds; much more than most of them are currently contemplating.   
 
IV. YIELD ENHANCEMENT WITH HEDGE FUNDS 
Another application of hedge funds that is often suggested is to use hedge funds to 
replace bonds.  A good example can be found in McFall Lamm (1999). The idea is that 
since hedge funds have a relatively high mean and low standard deviation and are only 
loosely correlated with equity, replacing bonds by hedge funds will substantially raise 
the expected return without an accompanying rise in standard deviation. To investigate 
the exact workings of this, we again created 500 different portfolios containing 20 
hedge funds and combined every one of these hedge fund portfolios with stocks and 
bonds. Doing so, the equity allocation was kept constant at 50%. In other words, starting 
with 50% stocks and 50% bonds, the hedge fund allocation is assumed to come fully out 
of the bond allocation. This gives rise to portfolios like 50% stocks, 40% bonds and 
10% hedge funds, 50% stocks, 30% bonds and 20% hedge funds, etc. As before, from ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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the monthly returns on the resulting portfolios we calculated the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. For hedge fund allocations ranging from 0% to 
50%, the 5
th, 10
th, etc. percentiles of the frequency distributions of these four 
statistics are shown in figure 5-8. 
 
<< Insert Figure 5 – 6  >> 
 
From figure 5 we see that, as intended, when the hedge fund allocation increases the 
median expected return rises in a linear fashion from 0.95% on a portfolio without 
hedge funds to 1.24% on a portfolio of 50% equity and 50% hedge funds. From figure 
2, which shows the frequency distributions of the standard deviation of the portfolio 
return, we see that replacing bonds by hedge funds in the way we did does not leave 
the portfolio standard deviation completely untouched. Over the range studied, it 
rises from 2.4% with no hedge funds to 3.1% with 50% hedge funds.  
 
<< Insert Figure 7 – 8  >> 
 
So far things are not too different from what investors (are told to) expect when 
replacing bonds by hedge funds. However, this is no longer the case if we look at the 
skewness of the portfolio return distribution. Figure 7 shows very clearly that replacing 
bonds by hedge funds will lead to a very substantial reduction in skewness. In addition, 
as shown by figure 8, it also causes a substantial rise in the return distribution’s kurtosis. 
The drop in skewness is very interesting. With the median hedge fund portfolio 
exhibiting a skewness of only –0.52, it is clear that in terms of skewness hedge funds 
and equity do not mix very well. In economic terms, the data suggest that when things 
go wrong in the stock market, they also tend to go wrong for hedge funds. In a way, this 
makes sense. A significant drop in stock prices will often be accompanied by a 
widening of a multitude of spreads, a drop in market liquidity, etc. As a result, many 
hedge funds will show relatively bad performance as well. A similar reasoning explains 
why the median portfolio of 50% hedge funds and 50% equity already has a kurtosis 
that is almost as high as that of 100% hedge funds (5.39). ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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We reach a similar conclusion as before. The improvement in expected return that is 
observed when bonds are replaced by hedge funds is not a free lunch. The higher 
expected return is obtained at the cost of substantially lower skewness as well as 
substantially higher kurtosis.  Figure 5-8 also confirm our previous conclusion with 
respect to the required size of the hedge fund allocation. To see at least some effect, 
investors will have to make an allocation to hedge funds that is much higher than what 
most are currently contemplating.   
 
V. BRINGING IT TOGETHER 
From the previous discussion it is clear that the beneficial effect of hedge funds on the 
mean or standard deviation of the portfolio return tends to go hand in hand with an 
opposite effect on the return distribution’s skewness and kurtosis. As a result, the overall 
shape of the portfolio return distribution can be expected to change substantially as a 
result of the inclusion of hedge funds. Figure 9 shows the return distribution of a 
portfolio of 50% stocks and 50% bonds as well as the return distribution of the median 
portfolio of 30% stocks, 30% bonds and 40% hedge funds.  
 
<< Insert Figure 9 >> 
 
Comparing both distributions we see that they intersect several times. Reading the graph 
from left to right, the net effect of the inclusion of hedge funds consists of: (1) a higher 
probability of a very large loss, (2) a lower probability of a smaller loss, (3) a higher 
probability of a low positive return, and (4) a lower probability of a high positive return. 
Most investors that use hedge funds for diversification will expect to trade in profit 
potential for reduced loss potential on a more or less equal basis. However, as shown 
clearly by figure 9, because of the increase in negative skewness the trade-off is not 
symmetrical. Investors can expect to give up more on the upside than on the downside. 
 
<< Insert Figure 10 >> ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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Figure 10 shows the return distribution of a portfolio of 50% stocks and 50% bonds as 
well as the return distribution of the median portfolio of 50% stocks and 50% hedge 
funds. Comparing both graphs we see that the net effect of replacing bonds by hedge 
funds consists of  (1) a higher probability of a large loss, (2) a lower probability of a 
smaller (positive or negative) return, and (3) a higher probability of a higher positive 
return. Most investors who replace bonds by hedge funds will expect the return 
distribution to simply shift to the right without changing shape. Figure 10, however, 
makes it clear that this shift will be accompanied by an extension of the left tail, i.e. a 
higher probability of a large loss.     
 
The above confirms that the case for hedge funds is less straightforward than often 
suggested and requires investors to make a trade-off between profit and loss potential. 
In essence, hedge funds offer investors a way to modify the risk-return characteristics 
of their portfolio.
3 Whether the resulting portfolio makes for a more attractive 
investment than the original is primarily a matter of taste though, not a general rule. 
The next question is of course what type of investor would be interested in trading in 
skewness for a higher mean return and/or a lower standard deviation. Since in general 
institutional investors will be better equipped to deal with a relatively large loss (they 
can raise premiums for example) than retail investors, one could argue that hedge 
funds are more suitable for institutional investors than for retail investors. So far, 
however, private investors have been the main investors in hedge funds. Driven by 
low interest rates, declining stock markets, and substantial marketing and peer 
pressure, institutional investors are showing interest but, apart from a number of US 
endowments, not many have made a significant allocation to hedge funds yet.  
 
VI. MEAN-VARIANCE OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS 
The allocation rules that we have studied so far are quite ad hoc, i.e. do not rely on more 
detailed information with regard to the statistical properties of the asset classes involved. 
To solve this we performed two standard mean-variance optimisations; one with only 
stocks and bonds and one with stocks, bonds and hedge funds as the available asset ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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classes. The results of both optimisations can be found in table 1 and 2. The differences 
between the case with and the case without hedge funds can be found in table 3. 
Throughout we concentrate on the median case.   
 
<< Insert Table 1-3 >> 
 
In table 1-3 the mean-variance efficient set is approached in two different ways. In the 
first part of each table we look at the highest possible mean for a given standard 
deviation. This is the mean-variance equivalent of the yield enhancement strategy 
discussed in section IV. In the second part of each table we look at the lowest possible 
standard deviation for a given mean return. This is the mean-variance equivalent of the 
diversification strategy discussed in section III. The remaining columns show the 
required portfolio allocations as well as the skewness and kurtosis of the resulting return 
distributions. Starting with the case without hedge funds (table 1), we see that moving 
upwards over the efficient frontier results in a straightforward exchange of bonds into 
stocks. Since stocks have a higher mean and a higher standard deviation than bonds, if 
we increase the standard deviation (mean), the mean (standard deviation) also goes up. 
While this happens the skewness of the return distribution drops quite significantly as 
stock returns are more negatively skewed than bond returns. The kurtosis of the return 
distribution remains more or less unchanged.  
 
<< Insert Figure 11 – 12 >> 
 
Next, we added hedge funds and recalculated the efficient frontier (table 2). Moving 
upwards over the efficient frontier again, we observe interesting changes in the asset 
allocation. Starting with a mix of 50% bonds and 50% hedge funds, bonds are 
exchanged for stocks while the hedge fund allocation remains more or less constant. 
When the bond allocation nears depletion, the equity allocation continues to grow but 
now at the cost of the hedge fund allocation, just as bonds are exchanged for stocks in 
the case without hedge funds. This process is graphically depicted in figure 11. Similar 
to the case without hedge funds, if we increase the standard deviation (mean), the mean ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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(standard deviation) goes up, while the skewness of the return distribution goes down. 
At the same time, the degree of leptokurtosis rises. Unlike what we saw before, 
skewness does no longer drop in a more or less linear fashion though. This is also 
shown in figure 12, which for given standard deviations shows the mean return and 
skewness of the portfolios on the mean-variance efficient frontier. From figure 11 and 
12 we see that skewness drops as long as bonds are being replaced by equity. The 
lowest level of skewness is reached when the bond allocation reaches 0%, i.e. with 
around 45% invested in stocks and 55% in hedge funds. After that, as hedge funds start 
to be replaced by equity, skewness rises again, reaching –0.80 when 100% is invested in 
equity. A similar but reverse phenomenon is observed for kurtosis. This confirms what 
we saw already saw before in section III and IV: in terms of skewness and kurtosis 
hedge funds do not combine very well with equity.   
 
What are the most striking differences between both mean-variance efficient sets (table 
3)? First, as expected, introducing hedge funds allows for a higher mean at a given 
standard deviations and a lower standard deviation at a given mean. The largest 
improvement is observed for relatively low means and standard deviations. For high 
means and standard deviations the effect is only small though.
4 Second, skewness drops 
with the drop being most striking for those cases where the mean or standard deviation 
improves most. This emphasizes that the improvement in mean and/or standard 
deviation is not a free lunch. Third, kurtosis rises with the highest rise occurring when 
the hedge fund allocation is highest. Again, we also see that to actually realize the above 
effects investors will have to invest a high portion of their assets in hedge funds. A 
meaningful improvement in mean return or standard deviation requires a hedge fund 
allocation of at least 25-30%. 
   
VII. MEAN-VARIANCE-SKEWNESS ANALYSIS 
From the above it is painfully obvious that standard mean-variance portfolio decision-
making is no longer appropriate when hedge funds are involved. Given the statistical 
properties of portfolios of stocks, bonds and hedge funds we need a decision-making 
framework that not only incorporates the mean and standard deviation of the portfolio ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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return distribution, but also (at least) its skewness. Mean-variance-skewness portfolio 
selection models received quite some attention in academia in the 1970s,
5 but interest 
faded in later years, partly because traditional asset classes tend to exhibit relatively 
little skewness. To assess where the mean-variance optimal portfolios that we calculated 
in the previous section fit into the mean-variance-skewness opportunity set, we first 
plotted the mean-variance efficient portfolios for the case with (red) and without (green) 
hedge funds in mean-variance-skewness space. The result can be found in figure 13. 
From the graph we clearly see that both efficient sets are significantly different, not only 
in terms of mean and variance, but especially in terms of skewness. The efficient set for 
the case with hedge funds offers more attractive mean-variance properties, but at the 
cost of much lower levels of skewness.      
 
<< Insert Figure 13 and 14 >> 
 
Next, we calculated the complete mean-variance-skewness opportunity set, which is 
depicted in figure 14. Figure 14 shows that when combining stocks, bonds and hedge 
funds the nature of the opportunity set is such that the most attractive mean-variance 
combinations are found at the lowest skewness levels. It is exactly these portfolios that 
mean-variance optimisation singles out for us, i.e. mean-variance optimal portfolios are 
also minimum skewness portfolios. From figure 14 we also see that the skewness effect 
can partially be avoided by opting for a lower mean and/or higher standard deviation. 
Unfortunately, doing so simply takes us back to the case without hedge funds. 
 
VIII. SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Apart from the fact that the only way to capitalize on the low volatility and low 
correlation properties of hedge funds seems to be to allocate quite a significant part of 
one’s wealth to hedge funds and accept the additional negative skewness and increased 
kurtosis that tends to come with it, there are a number of other important points to 
consider before making an allocation to hedge funds. In this section we briefly discuss 
three of them, all relating to the validity of the inputs used in the portfolio decision-
making process.    ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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Biased Data 
Apart from reporting and data entry errors and survivorship bias, monthly hedge fund 
return data exhibit another type of bias as well. As shown in Brooks and Kat (2001) 
and Kat and Lu (2002) for example, the available monthly returns of hedge funds 
involved in convertible arbitrage, risk arbitrage or distressed securities tend to exhibit 
a high degree of positive serial correlation. The explanation for this phenomenon lies 
in the difficulty for these types of hedge funds’ administrators to generate up-to-date 
valuations of their positions. When confronted with this problem, administrators 
either use the last reported transaction price or an estimate of the current market 
price, which may easily create lags in the evolution of these funds’ net asset value. 
As a result of the autocorrelation, estimates of the standard deviation of monthly 
hedge fund returns may be biased downwards by a significant amount. Brooks and 
Kat (2001) show that when corrected for serial correlation the standard deviation of 
the monthly return on the CSFB/Tremont Convertible Arbitrage index for example 
increases from 1.36% to 2.42%. Incorporation of this bias will make certain types of 
hedge funds more risky and their inclusion in the portfolio less attractive.  
 
Illiquidity 
Many hedge funds employ long lock-up and advance notice periods. Such restrictions 
are not only meant to reduce managing costs and cash holdings but also allow 
managers to aim for longer-term horizons and invest in relatively illiquid securities, 
including exotic OTC derivatives. As a result of the above, hedge fund investments 
are substantially less liquid than investments in common stocks or bonds. If this 
relative illiquidity is incorporated in the portfolio decision-making process, for 
example by lowering the expected return by an amount equal to the cost of 
securitization of the hedge fund portfolio, this will reduce the benefits of hedge 
funds.  
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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Estimation Error  
Since most data vendors only started collecting data on hedge funds around 1994 and 
hedge funds report into these databases only once a month, the available data set on 
hedge funds is very limited. Apart from spanning a very short period of time, the 
available data on hedge funds also span a very special period: the great bull market of 
the 1990s. This sharply contracts with the situation for stocks and bonds. Not only do 
we have return data over differencing intervals much shorter than one month, we also 
have those data available over a period that extends over many business cycles. This 
has allowed us to gain insight into the main factors behind stock and bond returns and 
also allows us to distinguish between normal and abnormal market behaviour. The 
return generating process behind hedge funds on the other hand is still very much a 
mystery and so far we have little idea what constitutes normal behaviour and what 
not. Risk arbitrage funds used to show impressive performance during the recent bull 
market but, with M&A volumes at their lowest level since 1996, are currently 
confronted by a serious lack of merger activity that can be expected to greatly impact 
their performance. Many investors are therefore switching to other relative value 
strategies like convertible arbitrage for example.  
 
With institutional interest in hedge funds on the increase another question that arises 
is when the hedge fund industry will reach capacity. Schmidt (2001) notes that while 
the hedge fund industry has experienced strong growth over the last five years more 
hedge funds are showing similar and lower returns. This could be taken as a first 
indication there may not be enough opportunities in the global capital markets to 
allow hedge funds to continue to deliver the sort of returns that we have seen so far. 
However, it could also simply be the result of sampling error or, following the collapse 
of LTCM, the implementation of improved risk management procedures and a 
reduction in the overall degree of leverage employed by hedge funds.   
 
Although this is by no means an easy task, the above uncertainties should be properly 
incorporated in the portfolio decision-making process. Of course, doing so will again 
reduce the attractiveness of hedge funds.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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IX. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we have studied the diversification effects from including hedge funds 
into a portfolio of stocks and bonds. We saw that introducing hedge funds in a 
portfolio of stocks and bonds will improve that portfolio’s mean-variance 
characteristics but at the cost of lower skewness and higher kurtosis. In addition, our 
results make it clear that to have at least some impact on the overall portfolio, 
investors will have to make an allocation to hedge funds which far exceeds the 
typical 1-5% that many institutions are currently considering. 
 
Strictly speaking our conclusions are only valid for the median hedge fund portfolio, 
i.e. an average portfolio of 20 funds with a strategy allocation more or less in line 
with the composition of the industry. We chose this portfolio because it resembles the 
average (fund of fund) portfolio that people invest in. It would be interesting to see 
whether it is possible to reduce the observed skewness and kurtosis effects, while 
maintaining the benefits in terms of mean and standard deviation, by changing the 
strategy allocation and/or including only funds with certain characteristics. Research 
in this area is currently underway.    
 
Hedge funds are not necessarily good or bad. They are just very different from what 
most investors are used to and require a more elaborate approach to investment 
decision-making than currently in use by most investors.
6 When studied in the 
traditional mean-variance framework, the inclusion of hedge funds in a portfolio 
appears to pay off impressive dividends. However, when taking into account the 
complexity of hedge fund returns, their relationship with each other and other asset 
classes, the illiquidity, and the lack of (reliable) data, the matter becomes quite a lot 
more complicated. Clearly, it will take a substantial research effort before these 
issues can be dealt with in a satisfactory manner.   ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1. Recent announcements by major institutions such as CalPERS and ABP that 
they will invest up to one billion in hedge funds are often used in the marketing 
of (funds of) hedge funds to smaller institutions. One should keep in mind, 
however, that, given the size of these institutions, these hedge fund allocations 
often amount to not more than 1% of total assets.  
 
2. Although funds of hedge funds often claim to possess superior fund selection 
skills, it is shown in Kat and Lu (2002) that over the period 1994 –2001 the 
average fund of funds underperformed an equally-weighted portfolio of 
randomly selected hedge funds by almost 3% per annum. Likewise, Amin and 
Kat (2001a) found a difference in efficiency between the average fund of funds 
and the average hedge fund index of almost 5%.     
 
3. The question whether hedge funds are the most efficient way to accomplish this 
modification is dealt with in detail in Amin and Kat (2001a). 
 
4. It should be noted that much of this is due to the specific nature of the hedge 
fund portfolio used. Typically, when adding hedge funds the largest 
improvement takes place around the hedge funds portfolio’s mean and 
standard deviation. For example, a portfolio of convertible arbitrage funds can 
be expected to improve especially the mean and standard deviation at the 
lower end of the efficient frontier, while a portfolio of long/short equity funds 
on the other hand will primarily improve the upper end.  
 
5. See for example Jean (1971, 1973) or Simkowitz and Beedles (1978). 
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6. A similar point can be made for other types of alternative investments such as 
venture capital, non-principal protected structured notes and bonds, etc. In 
this context it is interesting to note that the bulk of the outstanding 
catastrophe-linked bonds is held by only a handful of hedge funds. As long as 
no major catastrophe occurs these funds can be expected to perform quite 
well. However, when a catastrophe does eventually occur, they may be left 
with a large loss.  ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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Table 1: Mean-Variance Optimal Stock and Bond Portfolios 
Std. Dev.  Mean  % Stocks  % Bonds  Skew  Kurtosis 
2  0.77  32.79  67.21  0.04  3.23 
2.5  0.95  50.31  49.69  -0.34  2.97 
3  1.1  64.68  35.32  -0.55  3.24 
3.5  1.23  77.86  22.14  -0.68  3.57 
4  1.36  90.44  9.56  -0.77  3.86 
Mean  Std. Dev.  % Stocks  % Bonds  Skew  Kurtosis 
0.6  1.74  16.5  83.5  0.41  4.21 
0.7  1.87  26.21  73.79  0.20  3.60 
0.8  2.08  35.92  64.08  -0.03  3.11 
0.9  2.35  45.63  54.37  -0.25  2.95 
1  2.67  55.34  44.66  -0.42  3.04 
1.1  3.01  65.05  34.95  -0.56  3.25 
1.2  3.38  74.76  25.24  -0.66  3.49 
1.3  3.76  84.47  15.53  -0.73  3.73 
1.4  4.15  94.17  5.83  -0.79  3.94 
 
 
Table 2: Mean-Variance Optimal Stock, Bond, and Hedge Fund Portfolios 
Std. Dev.  Mean  % Stocks  % Bonds  % Hedge   Skew  Kurtosis 
1.5  0.74  2.83  47.41  49.76  -0.44  3.34 
2  0.92  18.07  26.81  55.12  -0.82  4.39 
2.5  1.06  29.95  10.75  59.3  -0.99  5.26 
3  1.2  45.07  0  54.93  -1.07  5.47 
3.5  1.3  67.08  0  32.92  -1.00  4.81 
4  1.39  86.14  0  13.86  -0.89  4.32 
Mean  Std. Dev.  % Stocks  % Bonds  % Hedge  Skew  Kurtosis 
0.7  1.44  0.15  51.04  48.82  -0.37  3.31 
0.8  1.65  8.32  39.99  51.69  -0.59  3.60 
0.9  1.94  16.49  28.94  54.57  -0.79  4.26 
1  2.27  24.67  17.89  57.44  -0.92  4.91 
1.1  2.63  32.84  6.84  60.31  -1.02  5.43 
1.2  3.02  45.83  0  54.17  -1.07  5.45 
1.3  3.49  66.67  0  33.33  -1.00  4.82 
1.4  4.04  87.5  0  12.5  -0.89  4.29 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
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Table 3: Changes Due to Introduction Hedge Funds in M-V Optimal Portfolio  
Std. Dev.  Mean  % Stocks  % Bonds  % Hedge   Skew  Kurtosis 
2  0.16  -14.72  -40.40  55.12  -0.86  1.16 
2.5  0.12  -20.36  -38.94  59.30  -0.65  2.29 
3  0.10  -19.61  -35.32  54.93  -0.51  2.23 
3.5  0.07  -10.78  -22.14  32.92  -0.32  1.23 
4  0.03  -4.30  -9.56  13.86  -0.13  0.46 
Mean  Std. Dev.  % Stocks  % Bonds  % Hedge  Skew  Kurtosis 
0.7  -0.43  -26.06  -22.75  48.82  -0.57  -0.29 
0.8  -0.43  -27.6  -24.09  51.69  -0.56  0.49 
0.9  -0.41  -29.14  -25.43  54.57  -0.54  1.30 
1  -0.40  -30.67  -26.77  57.44  -0.50  1.87 
1.1  -0.38  -32.21  -28.11  60.31  -0.46  2.17 
1.2  -0.36  -28.93  -25.24  54.17  -0.41  1.95 
1.3  -0.27  -17.8  -15.53  33.33  -0.27  1.09 
1.4  -0.11  -6.67  -5.83  12.5  -0.10  0.35 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  20






































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100




































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100





































0.95ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  21
 









































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

































0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100



























0.95ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  22
 
 







































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50




































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50





































0.95ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  23
 









































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50


































0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50



























0.95ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  24
 
















































-12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9
No HF
Yes HFISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  25
 
 


































































SkewnessISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance: 2002-11 
Copyright Amin and Kat, 2002  26




Figure 14: Mean-Variance-Skewness Opportunity Set.  
 